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A unique contribution of institutional theory is the insight that organizations need 
legitimacy as well as technical efficiency to survive and thrive in their environments (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  The institutionalized norms, practices, and logics 
which structure organizational fields exert isomorphic pressures, forming an “iron cage” which 
constrains organizational actions.  Organizations are seen as legitimate when they conform to 
field structures and operate within the iron cage (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Much work in 
institutional theory has focused on the diffusion of institutional structures and the forces which 
support institutional isomorphism. 
Yet not all institutional environments are highly institutionalized, and not all actors are 
equally constrained by institutional arrangements.  A great deal of work in the last two decades 
has shown that institutional entrepreneurs may arise to question institutional arrangements 
(DiMaggio, 1988), resisting them strategically (Oliver, 1991; Ang & Cummings, 1997), 
disrupting and deinstitutionalizing them (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001; Oliver, 1992), and 
reconstructing them to suit the desires of different actors (Anand & Peterson, 2000; Hargadon & 
Douglas, 2001; Zilber, 2002).   
Much of the prior work on institutional entrepreneurship has tended to focus 
retrospectively on the path of a single institutional innovation as it gained support in an emerging 
or existing field, often displacing an existing set of institutional arrangements (e.g., Greenwood, 
Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004; Munir, 2005).  Throughout this 
work, competing or independently evolving innovations which may also have been candidates 
for institutionalization are generally not discussed.  Yet, institutional change does not always 
occur as a solution pre-formed, to a problem that may not previously have been acknowledged. 
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Instead, disruptive activities by activists or insurgents may erode the legitimacy of one set of 
institutional arrangements without providing widely accepted arrangements to replace them.   
When fields have been sufficiently disrupted by deinstitutionalization work, there exist 
no legitimate institutionalized templates for field members to mimetically adopt to gain 
legitimacy.  The iron cage of institutional structures has been breached, and the means to 
attaining legitimacy is uncertain.   In such uncertain circumstances, Beckert (1999) has argued 
that institutional entrepreneurs will arise to promote institutional arrangements that favor their 
interests.  They will seek to rebuild the iron cage with new institutional arrangements (patterns, 
forms, practices, logics) that can be considered legitimate by those both inside and outside of the 
organizational field, therefore protecting the field from further disruption.  An actor within an 
organizational field could then adopt those arrangements to reduce the likelihood that its 
legitimacy could be challenged by those either within or outside of the field.  
Yet there is no guarantee that only a single institutional entrepreneur will arise.  
Frequently, there is significant disagreement among field constituents as to which arrangements 
should be adopted, or how new arrangements should be designed.  Several groups may engage in 
parallel institutional work, and find they are competing against and impacted by other actors 
sponsoring different arrangements. Yet, we know little about the processes by which new 
institutional innovations emerge, compete and resolve into shared logics and practices over time.  
In this research, we investigate the processes by which competing candidates for 
institutionalization, or proto-institutions (Lawrence, Hardy & Phillips, 2002), coalesce into 
shared practices and logics.  We study these processes in the context of the British Columbia 
(BC), Canada coastal forest industry from 1992 to 2006; an industry which had faced significant 
social and environmental criticism, and whose institutional arrangements had been delegitimated 
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by insurgents.  We identify the institutional work undertaken by leaders competing to promote 
their preferred institutional arrangements within an uncertain institutional environment.   
We find a process of co-creation of institutions involving multiple members of the 
organizational field, who compete and collaborate through multiple iterations of institutional 
development until a common template becomes diffused.  This co-creation process moves 
beyond heroic conceptions of institutional entrepreneurs that effect institutional change by sheer 
will.  Instead, we find ongoing negotiations, experimentation, competition, and learning, that 
resolves over time into shared conceptions of problems and solutions in organizational fields.  
This co-creation institutional work occurs simultaneously with continued disruption work, and 
involves concurrent development of maintenance mechanisms designed to hold institutions in 
place as they diffuse.   
We thus offer several contributions.  First, we show that institutional creation work can 
be a process of collaborative co-creation and/or competitive convergence, involving 
experimentation undertaken by multiple actors.  This process leads to a solution that embeds the 
interests of multiple parties.  In a collaborative process, shared templates emerge from 
consensus, negotiation and active co-creation.  In a competitive process, templates emerge from 
competitive convergence, in which actors translate some elements of others’ templates into their 
own in response to feedback from potential adopters.  Secondly, in these collaborative co-
creation and competitive convergence processes, we find that institutional disruption, creation 
and maintenance may occur simultaneously as actors try to discredit prior institutional templates, 
create and promote their own, and develop the means to diffuse and maintain their preferred 
templates at the same time.  Furthermore, we identify the effects of institutional detritus – the 
bits of logics, practices and identities remaining from the previously stable context and the 
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process by which it was disrupted (Schneiberg, 2006).  We find that institutional entrepreneurs 
remain constrained by some deeply held identities and logics, which they are only able to get 
beyond using collaborative co-creation processes.    
The chapter proceeds as follows.  First, we discuss the character of institutions and the 
growing literature on agentic institutional change.  We briefly review literature on institutional 
work, including institutional creation, disruption and maintenance, then focus attention on prior 
work which pertains to institutional creation work in disrupted environments and competition 
over institutional arrangements.  We then present our empirical study, discussing the 
methodology, and reviewing our findings.  Finally, we discuss our findings in the context of the 
literature on institutional work.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Purpose of Institutions 
Institutions have been defined as "humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction (North, 1990:97)”.  They result in “socially constructed, routine-
reproduced, program or rule systems (Jepperson, 1991: 149)” that “provide stability and meaning 
to social life” (Scott, 2001: 48).  Institutions reduce environmental uncertainty by establishing 
the standards and behaviours required for legitimacy within an environment.  Because 
“organizational decision makers have a strong preference for certainty, stability, and 
predictability in organizational life” (Oliver, 1991: 170, citing DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Zucker, 1977), strong institutional frameworks provide 
significant benefits for organizations.  In highly institutionalized organizational fields, 
institutional arrangements are supported by cognitive, normative and regulative pillars, meaning 
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they are taken for granted as natural, normatively valued beyond their technical usefulness, and 
reinforced by coercive mechanisms which sanction deviants (Scott, 2001).  Institutions include 
rule systems, laws, accepted practices, and common knowledge. 
Institutions are at the same time highly constraining.  They affect patterns of social 
relationships and domination which determine who holds power and access to valuable resources 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 2001).  These institutional arrangements are also self-
reinforcing in that they reproduce power positions and motivate dominant elites to maintain 
institutional arrangements in order to preserve their positions of privilege (Greenwood & 
Hinings, 1996).  The same institutional arrangements put other actors at a disadvantage and 
reduce their ability to effect change (Fligstein, 1991).  Highly institutionalized environments 
have thus been described as “iron cages” which constrain actors and drive isomorphism within 
organizational fields (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Enduring institutions are well noted in the literature; however, much of the recent 
literature adopting the institutional perspective has focused on institutional change.  Earlier work 
identified exogenous forces for institutional change, including political, legal or administrative 
shifts (Fox-Wolfgramm, Boal & Hunt, 1998; Hoffman, 1999; Oliver, 1991), technological 
changes (Barley, 1986), or changes in markets or stakeholders demands (Greenwood & Hinings, 
1996; Oliver, 1992).  Other work has focused on institutional entrepreneurship as a mechanism 
for institutional change (Beckert, 1999; Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; Maguire, et al., 
2004; and many others).  Much of this work has described nearly heroic institutional 
entrepreneurs, or “modern princes” (Levy & Scully, 2007), challenging an organizational field 
and molding it to suit their interests (Greenwood, et al., 2002; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; 
Hensmans, 2003).  However, the ability of a new institution to become sufficiently diffused and 
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taken for granted depends to a large degree on the willingness of incumbent actors to adopt the 
change.  This presents institutional theory with a paradox of embeddedness, since it is not 
obvious how embedded actors are able to effect change to the very institutions they take for 
granted (Holm, 1995; Seo and Creed, 2002). 
Recent work sheds light on the mechanisms of endogenous institutional change.  In 
studying Big Five accounting firms, Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) found that when elite firms 
identified substantial contradictions, either through exposure to neighbouring fields or as a result 
of clear misalignment within their own field, the firms became less embedded.  This lower level 
of embeddedness provided these firms with increased awareness of and motivation for change.   
Complementing this work, other research has proposed a competitive, dialectic struggle 
between opposing viewpoints that, once resolved, forms the basis for new variation in a diffusion 
model of institutional change (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006).  Building on the social 
movement literature (McAdam & Scott, 2005), actors are seen to engage in framing contests, 
construct cooperative and competitive networks, manipulate institutional arrangements or 
incentive structures, and collectively mobilize in order to effect change (Wijen and Ansari 2007; 
Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006).  These battles between insurgents and counter-movements of 
incumbents (Hensmans, 2003) disrupt existing arrangements, yet ready-made solutions may not 
be available, leaving much institutional work to be done.   
Once an environment has been disrupted and its conventions deinstitutionalized, 
legitimate and appropriate templates for behaviour in a field may be unknown.  This may be 
especially true when new actors or newly powerful actors differ significantly from former elites 
in their conceptions of what is appropriate.  The result is an uncomfortable state of uncertainty 
for organizational decision makers (Oliver, 1991; DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
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Contributing to this uncertainty are competing logics and the detritus of institutional materials 
left over from previous institutional work including political networks, alternative systems, and 
community associations (Schneiberg, 2006).   
Institutional Creation Work in Disrupted Environments 
In this chapter we are particularly interested in the work done by actors to create 
institutions within these disrupted environments.  As Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) described, 
institutional creation work involves defining rule systems and vesting them with the ability to 
confer property rights, constructing normative networks of actors possessing defined identities in 
relation to the new rule systems, and developing support for those rule systems through 
advocacy, theorizing and educating.  Actors develop proto-institutions: “new practices, rules, and 
technologies” which “may become new institutions if they diffuse sufficiently” (Lawrence, 
Hardy & Phillips, 2002: 281).  When actors are promoting a particular set of institutional 
arrangements as a solution to some problem in the field, we refer to that set of arrangements as a 
proto-institution.  Proto-institutions are candidates for institutionalization, if only enough 
members of the field will adopt them.  Where multiple proto-institutions have been proposed for 
the same purpose, it is not clear which proto-institution, if any, will become dominant.  It is 
important to note that, since institutional arrangements confer property rights and status, the 
competition over proto-institutions implies a competition over power and dominance within an 
organizational field. The opposite is also true.  Having more power in an organizational field 
implies that an actor can impose or influence the adoption of a set of institutional arrangements 
that will privilege its interests. 
Competition to define legitimate practices has received limited attention in the literature. 
Galvin (2002) described how medical professional associations competed with regulators and 
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advocacy organizations for influence in the medical field, implying increased ability to influence 
institutional arrangements.  Galvin’s study stopped short of examining the fine-grained dynamics 
of competition among those advocacy and professional organizations. Washington (2004) 
examined the competition between the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and 
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) in college athletics, finding that the 
NCAA extended its membership criteria to the very groups that the NAIA was better serving in 
order to fend off NAIA’s competitive threat.  In Reay and Hinings’ (2005) study of the Alberta 
government’s move to exclude physicians from health care decisions by forming regional health 
networks, physicians attacked the normative legitimacy of the health networks to the 
government’s principal constituency (the public), and used the support mobilized to negotiate an 
influential role for themselves within the new system.  Perhaps the most thorough empirical 
description of institutional competition is found in Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy (2002) study 
of Sun’s efforts to promote its Java open programming standards to a broad group of users.  
Competitors Microsoft and Hewlett Packard responded by introducing and/or supporting rival 
standards, counter-mobilizing users, and discrediting Sun.   
While each of these studies sheds some light on how actors compete for the right to set 
field-structuring rules and standards, they do not delve into the processes by which standards 
emerge and are changed through the competition.  In this chapter we seek to address how 
institutional actors create new institutional arrangements, and adapt them as they compete for 
dominance in disrupted environments.  How do actors compete and collaborate in constructing 
their collective iron cage when the basis for choosing among proto-institutions is unknown?  We 
address this research question via a longitudinal study of sustainable forest management standard 
development in the forest industry.  In this context, actors (including forest companies, 
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environmental groups, governments, and others) promoted a variety of proto-institutions, 
including certification and labeling schemes, regulations and land use processes.  We describe 
our methods, and then present our findings.  
METHODS 
To investigate proto-institutional competition we conducted a longitudinal study 
leveraging a detailed, multi-source data set situated within the British Columbia, Canada (BC) 
forestry context.  Since the BC setting is also influenced by transnational conflict over standard 
setting (McNichol, 2006), we also attend to global influences.  While our study focused on the 
1992 to 2006 time period relevant to the study of the proto-institutions, our analysis was 
informed by a deep knowledge of the context from prior work dating back to 1985.  The intensity 
and duration of the institutional disruption provided an ideal context for the study of the creation 
and competition of proto-institutions in disrupted contexts. 
Data 
The data for this research is based on an extensive qualitative database of interviews, 
organizational documents, news articles, press releases, and third party reports.   The semi-
structured interviews averaged 90 minutes and include interviews with 52 forest company 
participants, 10 environmentalists, 3 government officials, 4 forest-dependent community 
members and 3 certification body officials.   The interviews were conducted between 1996 and 
2007 with the majority completed in 1999-2000, in close proximity to the events under study 
(Miles and Huberman, 1984).  
In addition, 147 press releases from companies and Environmental Non-Governmental 
Organizations (ENGOs), over 50 news articles pertaining specifically to the proto-institutions 
under study, and extensive news summaries detailing the BC forest industry from 1992 to 2006 
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were gathered.  Secondary reports were also consulted including annual federal government 
reports on Canadian forests, firm annual reports, NGO reports, and other academic studies 
conducted in the context.   
Analysis 
The first step in the data analysis was to create a narrative describing competing proto-
institutions and their development over time (Langley, 1999). The narrative, which was 
constructed from the raw data and secondary sources, was supplemented by extensive 
comparison tables and a timeline describing the milestones in the development of the proto-
institutions.   This narrative provided a strong foundation and served as an important reference 
and analytical tool throughout the duration of the project. 
As a second step, we sought evidence of proto-institution construction and adaptation and 
the factors that influenced it.   We noted that proto-institution sponsors (the group that initially 
created the proto-institution) developed and adapted features for their proto-institutions, and 
promoted them to target groups.  We noted additional patterns of interaction between competing 
proto-institution sponsors and among proto-institution sponsors and the broader set of actors in 
the organization field.  We sought evidence of how the core features and target supporters of 
each proto-institution changed over time, and we looked for causal influences of those changes. 
For the third step, we traversed the entire data set, coding passages to illuminate the 
behavior of the actors in the context as they promoted or supported specific proto-institutions. 
Guided by Lawrence and Suddaby's (2006) discussion of institutional creation, maintenance, and 
disruption work, but maintaining sensitivity to emerging themes in the data, we iterated between 
theory and data to identify behavioral themes and their interrelationships, and processes of proto-
institutional competition. Since we noted that the proto-institutions were constantly evolving, we 
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chose to focus mainly on institutional creation work, though we noted that maintenance and 
disruption work occurred concurrently.  When possible, multiple data sources were leveraged in 
order to triangulate and validate our interpretation of the data (Jick, 1979).   This process was 
repeated, moving from the behaviors of individual actors to the behavior of classes of actors, 
identifying similarities and differences.  This method resulted in an analysis of how proto-
institutions became co-created through the institutional work of multiple actors in the BC 
forestry context.  
FINDINGS 
To present our findings, we first provide an overview of the BC Coastal forest industry 
and the emergence of the competing proto-institutions.  We then describe the institutional work 
undertaken by a variety of actors to construct and promote their favoured proto-institutions in the 
context of others’ competitive and collaborative actions.    
The BC Coastal Forest Industry:  A Disrupted Context 
Forests cover about 500,000 square kilometres of BC, and until recently, forestry was the 
primary industry, accounting for about half of BC exports, and nearly 300,000 jobs. Most (95-
97%) forests were harvested using clear cutting, a broadly accepted method which removed all 
trees from a logging site.  In BC during the 1980s and 1990s, a proliferation of environmental 
groups began demonstrating against both the BC government and forest companies, building on 
international concerns about the negative environmental impacts of deforestation in the Amazon 
basin.2  Environmental groups claimed that clearcutting was rapacious, that the government and 
forest companies were in bed together and could not be trusted to safeguard the environment, and 
                                                 
2 Environmentalists later labeled BC the “Brazil of the North”. 
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that the public had a right to be involved in forestry decision-making, since forests were a public, 
even planetary, resources.  Forestry firms and the BC government initially considered the 
environmentalists to be an ill-informed fringe group and either ignored them or had them 
arrested. However, the conflict escalated and was internationalized over many years of protest 
campaigns culminating in the summer of 1993 with the arrest of over 700 protesters3.   
By the mid-1990s, leading ENGOs adopted a new strategy by targeting international 
customers of forest products to persuade and coerce them into changing their purchasing 
behaviour. These customers, “fed up [with] buying B.C. lumber that seems to come with a 
protester attached to every two-by- four...”4, in turn put pressure on BC forest companies to 
practice sustainable forest management.  Both forest companies and their customers were highly 
motivated to find a workable solution to this dilemma.  
While the dominant harvesting practices were considered illegitimate by many outside 
the industry, and actors were motivated to change, a broadly acceptable system of sustainable 
forest management (SFM) did not exist.  Worldwide, retailers and ENGOs were “clamoring for a 
transparent, credible and uniform system” of demonstrating legitimate forest management to fill 
the void (McNichol, 2006: 369).  International certification schemes began to emerge in the 
1990s, targeted at providing credible information to purchasers and guidance to forest 
companies. Yet there was little consensus on appropriate harvesting practices, and the 
certification schemes themselves became a focus for the conflict.   
For an SFM system to be broadly accepted in the BC context, it had to meet the varied 
objectives of a number of stakeholders.  For environmentalists it had to 1) delineate a set of SFM 
practices (SFM practices), 2) ensure the protection of the most ecologically sensitive forests 
                                                 
3 Vancouver Sun, May 22, 1999, A13 
4 Vancouver Sun, May 5, 2000, A1 
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(protected areas), and 3) provide a permanent role for stakeholders in decision making processes 
associated with forest management (open process).  Collectively these can be referred to as 
satisfying social legitimacy criteria.  To satisfy the forest industry and gain firm acceptance, a 
system of SFM had to 4) increase access to national and international markets through universal 
recognition and acceptance (market access) 5) impose the least costs in terms of compliance 
(ease of implementation) and 6) reduce uncertainty by maximizing industry’s control over forest 
practice and harvest area decisions (industry control).  Collectively, these can be referred to as 
firm acceptance criteria.  There are clear conflicts in these objectives, such as the industry’s 
desire for control vs. the ENGOs’ desire for an open process.  Further, more stringent forest 
practices and greater protection of ecologically sensitive areas generally reduce the ease of 
implementation for forest companies.  Despite these opposing objectives, all actors shared the 
higher order objective of finding a system of sustainable forest management that reduced the 
conflict around forest practices for all stakeholders (forest companies, ENGOs, governments and 
customers) and could be considered legitimate by all. 
Emerging Proto-Institutions  
The field was left with fragments of institutional detritus: a dominant logic of clear 
cutting among forest companies which was contested by others, incomplete and controversial 
systems of SFM, a shared history of conflict and distrust between environmentalists and forest 
companies, and the ENGOs’ widely accepted rhetorical claims that the public had to protect 
forests from untrustworthy forest companies and governments.  Into this disrupted environment, 
several different proto-institutions were introduced as candidates for systems of SFM.  These 
were introduced in a relatively short period of time by four different types or groups of actors: 
activists, industry associations, the BC government, and elite organizational field members.   
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The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), a largely environmentalist-driven organization 
which emerged from the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, was the first to announce a 
certification standard, though the regional standards for BC were not finalized until 2002.5  
Forest industry associations around the world responded to the threat of FSC certification by 
initiating industry and government-based forest certifications, including the American Forest and 
Paper Association’s Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) certification and the Forest Products 
Association of Canada-initiated CSA SFM standard (controlled by the Canadian Standards 
Association), introduced in 1994 and 1996 respectively.  The BC government introduced the 
Forest Practices Code (FPC) in 1996 to ensure sustainable forest management and therefore 
respond to the ongoing conflict in the BC forest industry.  Finally, elite actors in the field also 
proposed programs to ensure sustainable forest management.  MacMillan Bloedel, the leading 
forest company, initially proposed a variable retention program and promoted it to other forest 
companies.  Later this program was adapted into an Eco-System Based Management (EBM) 
program, and it was promoted by elite forest companies and elite ENGOs in the organizational 
field.  Table 1 provides an overview and captures the important features, sponsors, key adopters 
and supporters, and perceived disadvantages of each proto-institution.   
____________________ 
Insert Table 1 
____________________ 
INSTITUTIONAL CO-CREATION IN COMPETITIVE CONTEXTS 
We initially summarize our findings here, then present them in detail.  In our analysis of 
the institutional creation work undertaken by actors in the BC coastal forestry context, we found 
                                                 
5 FSC standards involved 10 international principles plus a number of regional criteria that were to be negotiated 
through a multi-stakeholder process involving four chambers of environmental, social, economic and indigenous 
actors respectively.   
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a process of co-creation (shown in Figure 1), in which the sponsors of each proto-institution 
developed an experimental set of features designed to achieve specific objectives.  They 
consulted and promoted the proto-institution with an elite set of potential supporters.  These 
supporters usually suggested or negotiated features in the proto-institution in exchange for their 
support, in what we are calling a collaborative co-creation process.  When sufficient support had 
been obtained, the sponsors and supporters of the proto-institution positioned and promoted their 
proto-institution to the entire institutional context, and simultaneously disrupted competing 
proto-institutions.  To promote the proto-institutions, they employed logics that were shared by 
at least some members of the disrupted environment, and that fell into one of three categories:  1) 
they had been institutionalized within the industry prior to disruption by ENGOs, 2) they had 
become a shared part of the new institutional context through the disruption process, or 3) they 
were linked to discourses which had become institutionalized in the broader societal field.  By 
using these logics, developing supportive networks and setting up coercive mechanisms, proto-
institution sponsors were establishing the cognitive, normative and regulative foundations to 
maintain their proto-institutions.  As other proto-institutions were also introduced, each of the 
competitors observed how members of the organizational field responded to them, tried to 
influence these responses by disrupting their competitors, and then adopted the features that were 
valued by the market in a process of competitive convergence.   
____________________ 
Insert Figure 1 
____________________ 
 
The process of institutional creation work we present in Figure 1 was not linear, but 
iterative:  the initial development of a proto-institution usually included some elements of 
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collaborative co-creation and competitive convergence, and these processes continued regularly 
throughout the years of competition.  Sponsors of proto-institutions regularly engaged in 
disruption of competitors, and promotion of their own proto-institutions.  During initial 
development, they also established the maintenance mechanisms that would, over time, hold 
their proto-institutions in place.  They enhanced the proto-institutions over time with feedback 
from the institutional environment.   
Despite its iterative nature, we describe the model in a linear fashion for clarity.  We first 
describe the initial development, promotion and disruption activities and then the collaborative 
co-creation and competitive convergence activities and finally the maintenance mechanisms. 
Initial Development 
To come up with an initial set of features for its proto-institution, each sponsor identified 
its own objectives and the objectives of other actors in the context that would be likely to support 
or oppose the proto-institution.  For industry sponsored programs (CSA and SFI), the dominant 
objectives were of course to maximize the firm acceptance criteria of industry control, market 
access and ease of implementation.  However, the programs also had to perform well enough on 
the forest practices, protected areas and open process dimensions to achieve the social legitimacy 
necessary to maintain market access.  For ENGOs and the FSC program, on the other hand, the 
social legitimacy aspects were dominant, while the firm acceptance aspects were secondary.  For 
the BC government’s FPC, all stakeholders had to be satisfied in order to have a successful 
proto-institution.  Because of the forest industry’s importance to the BC economy, the industry 
acceptance criteria were slightly favored by the government.  For the elite actors sponsoring the 
EBM proto-institution, social legitimacy and firm acceptance criteria had to be jointly 
maximized since both leading firms and leading ENGOs were involved.   
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The sponsors of each proto-institution initially consulted with their targeted stakeholders 
in order to understand what features would be acceptable.  FSC had the most intensive 
consultation process, involving representatives from social, environmental, economic and 
indigenous peoples groups from the outset, yet it did not consult with the government, and 
economic representation was limited to marginal players in the industry.  Similarly the BC 
government held consultations with forest companies and environmental interests before 
introducing the FPC.  MacMillan Bloedel consulted with ENGOs, the public, the government, 
and academics, consultants and other industry representatives before it launched variable 
retention, and later used that research to help convince others to join the group of organizations 
sponsoring EBM.  This group of elite ENGOs and forest companies further conducted joint 
research on social, ecological and economic factors, negotiated rules, and then proposed them to 
a multi-stakeholder group charged with approving any agreements.  SFI’s and CSA’s 
consultation process focused inwardly on their own forest industry members and on government.  
Each also had to react to the competing FSC standard, however, necessitating the inclusion of the 
same components, albeit with greater process-, rather than outcome-based standards.  
Figure 2 illustrates the competitive position of each of the proto-institutions based on its 
performance on the six objectives, and further details are available in the appendix.  EBM and 
FSC maximized the social legitimacy criteria, while SFI/CSA maximized the industry 
acceptance criteria and performed much lower on the social legitimacy criteria.  EBM performed 
slightly better than FSC on ease of implementation and industry control, but potentially poorer 
on market access due to its local scope; international customers’ purchasing criteria were more 
likely to specify FSC than EBM.  Implementation of FSC was challenging for industry members, 
due to extensive stakeholder involvement including lengthy approval processes and ongoing 
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changes.  The BC government’s FPC, trying to be all things to all people, was accepted by none.  
It provided limited social legitimacy performance by protecting new parks, specifying some 
more sustainable forest practices, and initiating ongoing stakeholder consultation processes, but 
provided very limited market access benefits and yet still offered industry little control.  
______________________ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
______________________ 
Promotion 
Proto-institution sponsors and supporters expended considerable effort promoting their 
proto-institution.  We conceptualize these promotional activities as constructing and reinforcing 
the cognitive, normative and regulative institutional pillars that form the structure of institutions 
(Scott, 2001). In doing so, these actors not only added new institutional material but drew on the 
institutional “detritus” remaining from the disruption of the institutions in the forestry field 
(Schneiberg, 2006). 
Cognitive. According to Scott (2001), the cognitive pillar is associated with 
comprehensibility, taken-for-grantedness and a logic of orthodoxy.  Actions associated with the 
cognitive pillar are taken simply because they are considered right and natural.  Since the BC 
forestry field had been so thoroughly disrupted through years of conflict, there was only limited 
orthodoxy with which to work.  However, some of the sponsors linked their proto-institutions to 
orthodox logics from other fields.  For example, the FSC justified the involvement of multiple 
stakeholders in the development of SFM standards by drawing upon a widely accepted logic that 
the public should be involved in decisions regarding publicly owned land.  While dominant in 
other areas of public discourse, this notion represented a radical departure from the way forestry 
had previously been accomplished.  Furthermore, FSC borrowed the logic associated with 
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indigenous peoples’ land claims, which were surfacing as a significant political issue in the mid-
1990s, to justify extensive involvement of environment-friendly indigenous peoples in land use 
decisions. Finally, FSC used a market logic to encourage or coerce forest company customers to 
support FSC (or face consumer boycotts), and to encourage or coerce forest companies to adopt 
FSC (or face diminished market access).  Similarly, the BC government used the orthodoxy of 
government regulation in the service of protecting public goods when supporting the FPC.  The 
Canadian Standards Association was selected as the organizing body for CSA certification 
because it was trusted to administer multiple standards across many other categories, suggesting 
its right to produce the CSA SFM standard would be taken for granted.   
Normative. The normative pillar refers to social obligations and moral standards that 
actors are obliged to follow (Scott, 2001).  ENGO supporters set the normative context for FSC, 
attracting public support through advertising campaigns demonizing the destruction of BC 
forests.  This logic was left over from the disruption of the forestry field.  ENGOs promoted the 
FSC standard as the only certification system able to meet acceptable moral standards. In one 
advertisement in Time magazine, Pierce Brosnan, who played British secret agent James Bond, 
urged consumers to be “an action hero” and purchase only FSC certified wood6.  The FSC used 
the resultant public support to appeal to the social and environmental responsibilities and 
obligations of a cross-section of firms including large retailers, publishers, construction firms, 
furniture makers and homebuilders to gain support for its certification. A spokeswoman for a 
large retailer stated:  “we have a responsibility as the market leader” (with respect to sustainably 
harvested wood), and “we take that very seriously.”7  Another spokesperson for a different 
retailer admitted that while he did not know where the Great Bear Rainforest (a disputed area), 
                                                 
6 Vancouver Sun, January 15 pp. D1, D12 
7 Seattle Times, November 22, 1999. 
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was on a map, “it's certainly a name that means a lot to a lot of people.”8  The BC government 
and forest companies also used normative framing: they claimed that adopting the FPC and EBM 
was “doing the right thing” to protect the environment. EBM attached itself to the BC 
government’s multi-stakeholder consultation process, so that the initial announcement of EBM 
came from multiple stakeholders in agreement, suggesting moral appropriateness.   
All sponsors constructed supportive networks for their proto-institution to build a 
normative community.  For example, one ENGO assisted two leading forest companies in 
applying for and obtaining FSC certification for their forest operations9,10.  MacMillan Bloedel 
arranged meetings with other leading forest companies to discuss the conflict with ENGOs, gave 
away its research into variable retention harvesting practices and supported competing firms in 
improving their ability to employ variable retention. When that did not work, the firm was 
instrumental in establishing the group that sponsored EBM, inviting other elite firms and ENGOs 
to participate.  The ENGOs in this group also met with other ENGOs to encourage them to 
accept the EBM process.  Similarly, the forest industry association sponsors of CSA and SFI 
urged industry solidarity on forest certification using normative logics.  
Regulative. Finally, the regulative pillar pertains to laws, rules and the resulting sanctions 
that actors are subject to should they deviate. The logic is one of instrumentality (Scott, 2001).  
Each of the proto-institutions sponsors reinforced the regulative pillar by using coercive forces to 
gain support.  For example, the government-backed FPC and EBM carried the weight of law 
                                                 
8 Michael McCullough. Building supplies giant won't buy wood from `Great Bear Rainforest', The Vancouver Sun, 
Aug 9, 2000. pg. A1.  
9 April 25, 2002 press release from WWF.  http://www.wwf.ca/NewsAndFacts/NewsRoom/Default.asp - accessed 
July 19th, 2006. 
10 November 14, 2003 press release from WWF.  http://www.wwf.ca/NewsAndFacts/NewsRoom/Default.asp - 
accessed July 19th, 2006. 
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while the American Forest & Paper Association and the Forest Products Association of Canada 
coerced its members to obtain certifications by establishing it is a membership criterion.   
More generally, once firms join any voluntary certification program or standard, they 
submit to the coercive pressures inherent in the standard and its monitoring (Prakash and 
Potoski, 2006).  Even in cases where firms are not initially coerced into adopting a particular 
proto-institution, once they became members, proto-institution sponsors are able to apply 
sanctions including publicly communicating member’s violations and revoking membership.  
The FSC provided an example of this when it removed from membership a firm that was not 
performing to the standards the FSC and its supporters deemed appropriate11.  
FSC and its ENGO supporters quite aggressively used coercive forces, co-opting 
customers of forest products in order to apply market pressure to influence forest companies into 
adopting standards.  For example, the FSC campaigned to get printing firms to adopt FSC 
certification, resulting in over 25 printers receiving FSC chain of custody certification between 
2003 and 200512.  This put implicit pressure on providers of pulp and paper products to provide 
FSC certified supplies so that printers could provide FSC certified products.  ENGOs 
demonstrated at large retailers such as Home Depot and Lowe’s in order to influence the 
retailer’s purchasing policies in favour of FSC certified wood13.   
Disrupting Alternatives 
In addition to promoting their preferred proto-institutions, creators and supporters 
engaged in activities to discredit alternative proto-institutions.  The most active actors in this 
endeavour were the ENGOs who actively targeted the “environmentally destructive forest 
                                                 
11 Forest giant's operations get ISO approval: Interfor receives certification after passing an independent audit by 
KPMG Quality Registrar. The Vancouver Sun. Vancouver, B.C.: Jan 22, 2000. pg. D.3  
12 Canadian printers lead the way in FSC, August 4, 2005, FSC Press Release 
13 Vancouver Sun, August 17, 1999, p. D4. 
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practices endorsed by industry-backed”14 and “bogus” certifications including the CSA and SFI.  
They claimed the FPC was “soft” regulation and that the government was “in bed with the forest 
companies”.  Both the FPC and the CSA were said to be examples of “putting the fox in charge 
of the henhouse,” and SFI was similarly criticized.   
Actors also used legal means to challenge alternative proto-institutions.  For example, in 
October 2004, the Sierra Legal Defence Fund, on behalf the Sierra Club of Canada and the 
National Aboriginal Forestry Association, initiated eleven appeals of forest certifications issued 
by the CSA, claiming the certified companies did not meet CSA’s own standards.15   While 
public critique came mostly from activist organizations rather than firms or governments, 
privately, forest companies expressed serious concerns about the requirements of FSC, the FPC, 
and EBM, referring to the “unfinishable agenda” of ENGOs.   
Disruptions of alternative standards by the sponsors and supporters occurred throughout 
the process of creating proto-institutions.  The supporters also engaged in promoting proto-
institutions and disrupting alternative standards as they contributed to the collaborative co-
creation of a particular proto-institution.  The next section describes the co-creation process.  
Co-Creation – Competition and Collaboration 
Over time, the leading proto-institutions became more like each other, while the FPC 
failed as a standard of sustainable forest management.16 Sponsors of proto-institutions revised 
and refined the proto-institutions for two reasons: first, to respond to competitive moves, and 
second, at the behest of existing or potential supporters, who offered their conditional support.  
                                                 
14 Environmentalists Release Report Warning "Buyers Beware" of Bogus Forest Certification Schemes, Greenpeace 
PR, 26 Mar 03 
15 http://www.sierraclub.ca/national/programs/biodiversity/forests/campaign.shtml?x=750, accessed May 1, 2007. 
16 Note: the FPC succeeded as an institution, since it was a set of regulations that forest companies in BC had to 
follow to ensure access to public forests, and 95% of the forests in BC are public.  However, FPC had no legitimacy 
as a signifier of sustainable forest management.  
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The more dominant players in industry, environmental groups and government took strong 
leadership roles in the shaping of proto-institutions, leveraging their ability to influence others to 
gain concessions in the institutional arrangements.   
Competitive Convergence 
As actors promoted their proto-institutions, they adapted their strategy and product 
offering to match the emerging competitive environment.  This involved blending elements of 
the accepted strategies of other proto-institutions, while balancing the stringency of requirements 
against their ease of implementation.  For example, a CSA representative originally expressed 
the opinion that labeling programs result in a “hodgepodge of competing claims”17.  However, as 
the FSC labeling system began to gain acceptance, the CSA shifted gears and in 2001 adopted its 
own forest products labeling program18.  SFI and CSA each enhanced their stakeholder 
consultation processes and implemented some performance-based measures as a result of FSC’s 
strengths in that area (Von Mirbach, 2004: 21).  
The SFI responded to criticisms that it only served industry interests by constructing an 
independent board to manage the program19.  FSC was similarly criticized for being too close to 
ENGOs; it countered with public relations messages distancing itself from them.  Both SFI and 
CSA responded to FSC’s transnational approach (featuring global principles for international 
recognition and local customization for stakeholder support) by gaining the support of the 
Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certifications, a European certifier of certifiers.   
This competitive convergence is not unique to the BC context.  As McNichol (2006: 372) 
described, “Competing alternative programs that originally appeared to thwart the FSC’s efforts 
                                                 
17 1996, State of Canada’s Forest Industry. 
18 2001.07.20 CSA Press Release, http://www.csagroup.org/news/releases/default.asp - Accessed July 19th, 2006 
19 http://www.sfiprogram.org/aboutsfi.cfm - Accessed May 5th, 2007 
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have slowly morphed, seemingly paradoxically, to embrace and embody (at least on paper) many 
of the same rules and norms within their operations”.   
Collaborative Co-Creation 
Proto-institution sponsors also responded to the demands of supporters both in the initial 
design of proto-institutions, and in subsequent adaptations.  As the proto-institution was 
implemented, supporters were able to judge its effectiveness with respect to their criteria and put 
pressure on sponsors to make changes.  For example, when the BC government’s stance shifted 
to become more industry-friendly, the government adapted the FPC to the needs of industry by 
simplifying its implementation, changing it from a process and results-focused standard, to a 
results-only standard to be self-monitored by the industry20.  The development of the EBM and 
FSC standards represented similar collaborative efforts among multiple stakeholder groups.   
When FSC was faced with customer complaints that FSC-certified products were not 
available in sufficient quantities to achieve the targets ENGOs demanded of customers, FSC 
responded with a number of changes.  First, they allowed small woodlot owners to band together 
to save time and resources in achieving FSC certification.  Next, they also relaxed the percentage 
of FSC certified wood required for labeling in a manufactured product.  Finally, FSC partnered 
with two forest companies (Tembec and Domtar) to encourage additional supply. In short, many 
actors had to negotiate features with supporters both in the early phases of proto-institution 
development, and later on to adapt the proto-institution.  Supporters thus helped to co-create the 
proto-institutions by negotiating features in exchange for their support.   
                                                 
20 BC Government Forest Practices Home Page - http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/tasb/legsregs/fpc/ - Accessed May 5th, 
2007. 
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Establishing Maintenance Mechanisms 
The final form of institutional co-creation work we found focused on constructing 
institutional maintenance mechanisms to facilitate the persistence of proto institutions.  Starting 
at initial creation, each of the proto-institutions studied included planned or actual mechanisms 
for their own maintenance both to ensure the proto-institution “stuck” among early adopters, and 
to stabilize the proto-institution once it became more widely adopted.  The mechanisms worked 
by reinforcing the regulative, cognitive, and normative pillars of the proto-institution.   
Sponsors and supporters created these maintenance mechanisms in a variety of ways.  
First they changed or established incentive structures and coercive mechanisms that reinforced 
desired behaviors.  They constructed normative networks and reinforced solidarity among 
existing ones to establish a community of shared meanings which would reproduce the 
institution.  Finally, sponsors and supporters continued to link proto-institutions to existing logics 
in the field through ongoing promotion and maintenance efforts.   
Specifically, the industry associations modified their membership rules to require 
members to obtain their preferred certifications.21  This coercive pressure had the added effect of 
creating a normative network that built and enhanced solidarity among industry members, 
particularly with respect to SFI.  The solidarity not only acted as a normative foundation for 
compliance, but was likely responsible for the FSC’s inability to generate sufficient timber 
supply in North America, which lead to a relaxation of FSC standards (Gale 2004).  Auditing and 
monitoring functions also served as common regulative maintenance mechanisms.  The BC 
government’s Ministry of Forests actively monitored companies’ compliance with the FPC.  
Each of the standards mandated that its requirements be embedded in a forest company’s 
                                                 
21 Members of the American Forest Products Association were required to obtain SFI certification.  Members of the 
Forest Products Association of Canada were required to obtain at least one of CSA, SFI or FSC certification.   
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standard operating procedures, and certification bodies required ongoing re-certifications.  The 
FPC, EBM and FSC also relied on deterrence to maintain proto-institutional compliance by 
emphasizing that ongoing conflict could only be avoided if companies followed the rules.  
DISCUSSION 
We have described the institutional creation work associated with “building the iron 
cage” in disrupted and competitive contexts by examining the efforts of actors who developed 
and supported competing proto-institutions.  We have described five categories of activities 
including initial development, promotion, disrupting alternatives, co-creation and establishing 
maintenance mechanisms.  These activities are found to operate in no fixed order and in a highly 
iterative manner.  Institutional work does not proceed in a linear fashion from disruption to 
creation to maintenance, but instead involves all three of these activities at the same time and 
during substantially overlapping time periods.   
We find that institutional creation work involves two co-creation mechanisms which each 
operate to ensure proto-institutions embed the interests of multiple actors in the institutional 
context.  The first mechanism is collaborative co-creation where adjustments are made to proto-
institutions in response to the demands of potential supporters.  The second mechanism is 
competitive convergence, where proto-institutions are adjusted in response to feedback from 
potential adopters of the proto-institution on both creators’ own proto-institutions as well as on 
competing proto-institutions.  Actors create experimental proposals for adoption and discuss and 
promote them with potential supporters.  They adapt them to accommodate supporters’ needs, 
promote them more broadly and simultaneously work to disrupt competing institutions.  The 
proto-institutions are refined by competitive convergence, where successful features of other 
proto-institutions are imitated, and by collaborative co-creation, where through extensive 
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discussion and collective decision making among multiple supporters of a proto-institution, a 
common meaning system emerges, facilitating proto-institution adoption.  Finally, proto-
institution sponsors create mechanisms to maintain their proto-institutions, both while they are in 
the development stage and going forward.  We have thus addressed our research question 
concerning how institutional actors create new institutional arrangements, forming a new iron 
cage, and how they adapt these arrangements as they compete for dominance in disrupted 
environments.  We have shown that the iron cage is the work of many craftspeople that 
knowingly, and unknowingly, competitively and collaboratively, work together towards the 
development of a dominant logic and taken for granted practices.   
Institutional Creation Work in the Context of Competition 
Prior studies frequently describe institution creation work in the absence of competition, 
highlighting institutional entrepreneurs with singular visions and relatively unconstrained agency 
pursuing specific projects.  While it has been understood that these institutional entrepreneurs 
must build support for their institutional change projects, prior work has not emphasized the 
tradeoffs inherent in such promotion work.22   Support comes with a price, and usually involves 
an adaptation of the proto-institution to embed something that will privilege or protect the 
interests of supporters.  Even non-supporters’ interests constrain an institutional entrepreneur’s 
actions if those interests have attracted sufficient attention.      
Interests among groups often conflict; proto-institution creators are thus unable to satisfy 
the demands of all people.  Since actors have several competing proto-institutions which they 
can adopt, they are able to leverage their influence to demand revisions and thereby co-create 
institutions with proto-institution sponsors. The set of features in any proto-institution that is 
                                                 
22 Though such tradeoffs seem similar in nature to Selznick’s (1949) notion of co-optation. 
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sufficiently diffused is likely to reflect the relative power positions of each actor in the 
institutional context.  In our study, ENGOs were able to generate sufficient support to require 
inclusion of features like stakeholder consultation and forest practices in every proposed proto-
institution.  The ENGOs’ influence significantly changed the nature of mainstream decision-
making in forestry.  Yet they had not, as of the time of writing, been able to completely dictate 
the nature of new proto-institutions because forest companies continued to maintain a strong 
power position in the BC coastal forestry context.   
More generally, regardless of which proto-institution wins the contest for dominance (if 
any do), institutional creation is not likely to be a winner-take-all game.  The mechanisms of 
collaborative co-creation and competitive convergence ensure that the interests of various actors 
will be embedded in the winning proto-institution to the extent that those actors are able to 
command support and resources for their institutional projects.   
Thus, instead of the institutional design work featured in the institutional 
entrepreneurship literature, we see a much greater emphasis on collective action (Hargrave & 
Van de Ven, 2006: 882), involving “political action among distributed, partisan, and embedded 
actors” which we see as playing out through collaborative co-creation and competitive 
convergence mechanisms.  Each actor (with influence), striving for their own interests, will add 
their own design features to the iron cage.  Through the mechanisms of co-creation and 
convergence, the final institutional arrangements are likely to embed the interests of all the key 
players, at a particular point in time, into a tightly woven structure.  The complexity of the iron 
cage structure (due to the multiple embedded interests) makes the cage durable and constraining 
in the face of efforts to change it; each component of the cage supports the interests of some 
relatively influential members of the organizational field.  While the empirical research 
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demonstrates that institutional change is possible and the iron cage is not impervious to attack 
and destruction, this process of co-creation illustrates some of the reasons behind the 
constraining force of the iron cage.   
While we believe that collaborative co-creation and competitive convergence are both 
likely to occur and operate together in disrupted environments, based on the analysis of our 
empirical context, we speculate that they may lead to different outcomes.  In processes of 
collaborative co-creation, actors with different agendas and meaning systems work together to 
construct the institutional arrangements, and in doing so, they develop the common meaning 
systems that characterize stable organizational fields (Scott, 2001).  Collaboratively created 
proto-institutions are much more likely to diffuse to the actors that have developed the shared 
meaning systems to support them.  Co-creators can then adjust the way they frame the solutions 
to align with the meaning systems that dominate within their own networks, to diffuse the 
innovations further, assisted by the social capital they have within their own networks.  The iron 
cage becomes stronger, and the institution diffuses among a larger group of actors.   
On the contrary, we believe that where competitive creation dominates over co-creation, 
it is much more likely that the field will segment into niches, each supporting a particular set of 
arrangements.  Through competitive convergence, the same features may exist across different 
proto-institutions, but they may have different interpretations within niches, and niche 
participants may disagree violently with the interpretations of other niches. Furthermore, the 
logics of competition and conflict themselves will limit the willingness of actors to adopt other 
proto-institutions across niches, even when they have similar features.  For example, while FSC 
and EBM similarly protect forest practices and ecologically sensitive areas and are equally 
onerous to implement, the inclusive development process of EBM made it much more acceptable 
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to the forest companies than FSC, and not less acceptable to the ENGOs.  Forest companies have 
been constrained by their previously institutionalized beliefs about environmentalists (and vice 
versa), and thus had trouble understanding ENGO demands even while they understood they 
needed to respond to them.   Forest companies believed that ENGOs had an “unfinishable 
agenda” that would permanently create uncertainty for them, and so any solution developed 
predominantly by ENGOs was distrusted.  Accepting FSC would be “giving in” to 
environmentalists’ demands.  Similarly, the ENGOs’ belief that you couldn’t leave the “fox in 
charge of the henhouse” prevented them from accepting CSA or SFI, even as these systems 
became more convergent with more stringent proto-institutions.    
These competitive logics are examples of detritus left over from the prior periods of 
institutional stability and disruptive conflict (Schneiberg, 2006).  While Schneiberg (2006) spoke 
of the leftover institutional material from paths not taken, this paper also identified the leftover 
institutional material from paths taken, then disrupted.   
These bits of detritus, like the institutions once associated with them, can be both 
enabling and constraining.  As a number of authors have suggested, the institutional material can 
be enabling because it can be overlain onto new innovations, facilitating their acceptance (e.g., 
Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003).  Further, the 
detritus can be used by institutional entrepreneurs as a starting point around which they can build 
support (Schneiberg, 2006; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007).  Conversely, the detritus can be 
constraining because even in disrupted contexts, certain institutional materials will still have 
significant influence among some groups, and institutional entrepreneurs must find a way to 
navigate through the leftover logics, practices and relationships that continue to exist in the 
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institutional context, since these contradictory logics are resources which can be used to contest 
the legitimacy of innovations (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005).   
Implications for Theories of Institutional Change 
Our findings have implications for theories of institutional change.  We address the 
criticism of the many stories that exist in the literature of heroic institutional entrepreneurs, who, 
either as individuals (e.g., Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004), or 
as organizations (e.g., Garud, et al., 2002; Greenwood, Suddaby & Hinings, 2002; Hensmans, 
2003), bring about institutional change through sheer force of will and who are somehow 
undersocialized and unconstrained by institutional arrangements.  Instead, we share with other 
authors an image of interest-driven actions by actors in an institutional context who are not 
undersocialized, but who may be both constrained by some logics and enabled by others because 
of the existence of competing logics and a diversity of institutional materials (Schneiberg, 2006; 
Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).   
Yet, we also identify that there are multiple actors that are navigating the diverse 
institutional debris, and several of them may be acting independently and concurrently as 
institutional entrepreneurs. These actors craft strategies to effect institutional change; however 
they pursue their projects while other actors are simultaneously pursuing different projects.  
Through the mechanisms of collaborative co-creation and competitive convergence, the proto-
institutions they develop are significantly modified by each other’s presence, and as a result, 
much more reflective of the interests of multiple actors in the field.  Proposed changes are 
experimented with and the demand for various features is assessed in a market for acceptance of 
the institutional arrangement.  In short, institutional change is emergent, resulting from the 
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interests of multiple actors embedded in the new institutional arrangements, reinforcing the 
arrangement’s durability to future changes.   
This study also deals with the divergence between some examples of institutional change 
that suggest that institutional entrepreneurs must overlay new institutional arrangements with 
existing features (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001), and others that 
describe actors who reject and vilify existing institutional logics (e.g., Hensmans, 2003).  
Extending the work of Schneiberg (2006), we show that in disrupted organizational fields both 
examples are valid.  The detritus from past institutions and the institutional material from the 
conflict itself exist in the context, along with societal logics to which field members are exposed.  
Actors draw widely from the institutional material littering the path, either applying it or 
vilifying it, recognizing that elements will resonate with some groups more than with others.  
Through co-creation processes, actors may find a way to integrate competing and diverse logics.  
Through competitive convergence processes, actors may find a way to build enough elements 
into a proto-institution that appeal to those with competing logics that the proto-institution 
becomes accepted.  Yet diffusion may be prevented if actors are unable to shed their past 
identities as enemies.  We thus find that even in very disrupted institutional environments, the 
detritus of past arrangements and battles constrains the acceptance of institutional change 
projects, but also enables them due to a richer set of material available to institutional 
entrepreneurs.   
CONCLUSIONS 
We have focused attention on the competition among proto-institutions in disrupted and 
competitive field contexts, identifying the institutional work undertaken by actors to create, 
promote and refine their proto-institutions and respond to competitive moves.  This research fills 
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a gap in the study of institutional emergence by focusing on the study of institutions in the 
making, arising within heavily disrupted organizational fields.   Proto-institutions in competitive 
contexts are adapted and refined until they begin to converge on acceptable institutional 
arrangements.  This process of collaborative refinement and competitive convergence explains 
how the interests of influential actors both inside and outside the organizational field become 
embedded in institutional arrangements.  The process of competition or collaboration surfaces 
their demands, and the support those demands are able to attract determines whether or not they 
become embedded in convergent solutions.  We also observed that institutional creation, 
disruption and maintenance occur simultaneously during institutional competitions, and that 
some new institutional creation is driven by a desire to preserve the power positions of 
incumbents in organizational fields.   
We expect that this co-creation process by multiple actors of different types is much more 
common than the current literature suggests.  Furthermore, it may be rising in importance over 
time, as more actors, and more non-traditional actors, involve themselves in new arenas, 
especially through the rise of social and environmental sustainability issues.  We submit that the 
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Table 1:   
Overview of Proto-Institutions 
 
 
 FSC Industry Certification 
(SFI and CSA) 
FPC EBM 
Full Name Forest Stewardship Council Sustainable Forest 
Initiative and Canadian 
Standards Association 




1993; 1996 in BC;  BC standards 
ratified in 2002. 
1994, 1996 1996 2003  
Features Chain of custody; labeling; 
practices & processes; (minimum 
threshold, outcome- & process 
based). 
Chain of custody; 













Sponsors ENGOs and NGOs; Forest 
company customers; Traders. 
Industry-prompted  BC Government. Elite forest companies 




Leading ENGOs; social groups; 
indigenous peoples; customers of 
forest companies; peripheral 
forest companies. 
Most forest companies 
and forest industry 
associations; peripheral 
NGOs.  
All BC forest 
companies (compliance 
regulated).   
Leading forest 
companies and ENGOs; 
Ratified by a multi-
stakeholder process and 
the BC government. 
Perceived 
Disadvantages 
Seen to be associated with 
ENGOs. Hard to implement.  
Industry driven. Considered largely 
irrelevant to conflict. 
Not internationally 




Figure 1:   

























































































 Figure 2:   








































Appendix 1:   
Detailed Assessment of Each Proto-Institution 
 
 FSC FPC SFI CSA EBM 
Principal Target 
Supporters 




ENGOs; the public.  
Forest companies; 
customers of forest 
companies. 
Forest companies; 
customers of forest 
companies. 
Forest companies; ENGOs; 
Government; customers of 
forest companies; other 
stakeholders. 
Geographic Focus Transnational BC US Canada Coastal BC 
Value Proposition Consensus-based to protect 
environmental, social and 
economic values; Locally 
customized; Specialized 




regulations to protect 
the environment and 
answer critics.  
US forest company 
rallying point to define 
certification on industry 
terms, to answer some 
critics and present an 
alternative to FSC. 
Industry-friendly 
certification to answer 
some critics and present 
an alternative to FSC.  
Forest Cos:  stops pressure;  
ENGOs: protects eco-
systems; provides an open 
decision process; 
Gov’t: stops pressure, 
resolves stakeholder 
conflict; Other stakeholders: 
protects interests.  
Social Legitimacy 
(Forest practices, 
protected areas and 
process) 
High: Universally recognized 
by ENGOs as strong 
acceptable standard. 
Low: Considered 
baseline by ENGOs. 
Low: Viewed as 
insufficient by ENGOs. 
Low: Viewed as 
insufficient by ENGOs. 
High: Strong broad local 
support suggests effective at 





recognized – satisfies most 
stringent purchasing policies. 
Low: Not part of 
customer purchasing 
policies  
Moderate: Approved by 
Programme for 
Endorsement of Forest 
Certifications  
Moderate: Approved by 
Programme for 
Endorsement of Forest 
Certifications 






different forest practices 
required and subject to 
ongoing stakeholder input. 
Moderately 
difficult: at first, 
easier with structures 
in place. 
Relatively simple Relatively simple Difficult: Significantly 
different forest practices 
required and subject to 
ongoing stakeholder input.  
Industry Control Low: The stakeholder 
consultation process is 
ongoing and firms are subject 
to revisions.  Industry 






High: The industry 
initially set these 
standards and continued 
to wield significant 
influence. 
Moderate to High: This 
standard has more. 
Moderate: Ongoing 
stakeholder input. 
 
